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The results of the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) reveal that
women in Ethiopia prefer fewer children than men, which can be ex-
plained by the greater costs that women have to incur from pregnancy,
delivery and care for children. In view of diﬀering preferences it is yet
not clear which factors determine the ﬁnal decision. The aim of this
study is to shed light on the impact of diﬀerent bargaining weights on
family planning within married couples in rural Ethiopia. Bargaining
over fertility can be split into two parts: spacing between births and
the number of children. Building on the intrahousehold bargaining
framework I investigate both aspects. Applying multistate and count
data models I test the hypothesis that women’s bargaining power is
negatively related to the number of children and positively to the pe-
riod length between adjacent births using a detailed data set from rural
Ethiopia. Both hypotheses ﬁnd support from the data.
Keywords: Fertility, intrahousehold bargaining, multistate model, Ethiopia
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Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by exceptionally high population growth
compared to other parts of the world. The Population Reference Bureau
(2004) reports estimates, that population growth in sub-Saharan Africa
amounts to 2.5% per annum, while for example population in Asia is grow-
ing at an annual rate of 1.6% (China excluded). Growing populations exert
pressure on resources, thus hampering economic development that is cru-
cially needed. Several policies have been implemented all over the region
in order to slow down population growth, although with mixed results. As
decisions over the desired number of children are intimatly personal, it is dif-
ﬁcult to directly address the demand for children. Hence indirect measures
need to be undertaken like for instance the dissemination of contraceptives
through public family planning programs. The scope of policy options is
further limited because couples may have diﬀering preferences concerning
their desired number of children. From the results of a number of studies it
turned out that couples are unlikely to use contraceptives if only the woman
and not the man wants to limit births (Dodoo 1998, Bankole and Singh
1998, Casterline et al. 1997, Mesﬁn 2002, Short and Kiros, 2002).
There is an ongoing debate on whether women and men have diﬀering
preferences over the number of children in general and if so how large the
diﬀerence is. In an early review of the literature, Mason and Taj (1987) found
that a general conclusion could not be drawn as the diﬀerences in preferences
appeared to be small. The gap between women and men, however, seems
to be greater in countries with high fertility rates, as compared to those
where population growth is relatively low. In a more recent investigation,
Bankole and Singh (1998) compare 13 African countries and ﬁnd that in all
of them men desire more children than women. The maximum diﬀerence is
3.9 children, reported from Niger.
In economic terms, the demand for children originates from the utility
that parents derive from children. Diﬀerent preferences therefore result from
diﬀerent costs that accrue to either women or men. In developing societies
women have to carry the burden of pregnancy, delivery and most of the
times care for the children. With every birth a woman puts her health (and
life) at risk, as the supply of ante- and post-natal medical care is especially
in rural areas very low. Women further incur the risk of short or long-term
1illnesses which are directly related to pregnancy. If the period between two
births is not suﬃciently long, the body cannot fully recover thus increasing
the likelihood of falling sick. The same holds for low nutritional status which
is frequent in rural areas (Mason and Taj 1987). Other costs accrue from the
opportunity costs of caring for children. Since in the African context, couples
often do not have a common budget (Doss 1996, Udry and Duﬂo 2003),
women may not be compensated for income losses by their husbands. Also,
Caldwell (1982) reports that the resulting increase of the labor force due
to an additional child rather beneﬁts the husband. From a practical point
of view, women have therefore a lower payoﬀ from having many children
within a short period of time.
Knowledge of diﬀering preferences is however not suﬃcient to make a
statement on the true demand for children. When couples have diﬀering
preferences over the number of children, they must somehow come together
and ﬁnally come up with a decision. The question here is, how large is
the number of realized births and how is the decision achieved? How rele-
vant are preferences of women? The answer to this question is important
because it can help to shape policies which aim at reducing the fertility
rate. If policy makers know whom to address and how, family planning
programs can be implemented much more eﬀectively. Any family planning
policy not only needs to consider the prevailing desire for children, but also
must acknowledge, that this is a weighted average of individual preferences.
In order to improve eﬃciency, the family planning program must take into
account how these weights are determined. If indeed, women have lower
fertility preferences than men, then increasing the inﬂuence of women on
household decision making would help to bring down the demand for chil-
dren. Hogan, Berhanu, and Hailemariam (1999) provide an example from
Southern Ethiopia, where indicators of female autonomy are positvely re-
lated to the use of contraceptives. Dyson and Moore (1983) and Murthi,
Guio, and Dreze (1995) found the same relationship between autonomy and
family planning in India.
The anlysis of diﬀering preferences among couples has attracted wide
interest in the past. In contrast to the classic Beckerian household model,
Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Chiappori (1988,
1992), and Lundberg and Pollak (1993) have developed approaches that al-
low for modeling and estimating the outcomes of household decision making
2when preferences are not common. The underlying idea of these models is
that household members have diﬀerent weights in household decision mak-
ing. The weight reﬂects the capability of the respective household member
to accomplish personal interests. Empirical investigations frequently ﬁnd
support for the hypothesis that the household members’ weights inﬂuences
the outcome of household decision making (see Fortin and Lacroix 1997,
Browning et al. 1994, Doss 1996, Browning and Chiappori 1998, Thomas
1990, Maluccio and Quisumbing 1999, Haddad and Hoddinott 1995).
Based on these ideas, Eswaran (2002) introduced a model embedded
in the Nash bargaining framework that describes the household decision
making over fertility. In accordance with the intrahousehold bargaining
models, he concludes that the number of children is a function of (i) the
preferences of wife and husband, and (ii) the bargaining weight of each of
them. Cain (1983) provides a further reason, why bargaining weights can
have an impact on fertility. A widely used measure for bargaining weight is
control over assets (Maluccio and Quisumbing, 1999, Beegle, Frankenberg,
and Thomas, 2001), whereas low asset ownerhsip is associated with a low
weight. In many developing countries, a woman who does not have any
assets at her personal disposal is often left without anything in case of divorce
or widowhood. Asset-poor women are thus likely to prefer more children
as an insurance against extreme poverty, since especially younger children
usually stay with the mother.
This study looks at household decision making and fertility goals in rural
Ethiopia from two perspectives: (i) the impact of bargaining weights on the
decision to space births, which has turned out to be almost as important
as limiting births itself (Schultz 1997, Hogan, Berhanu, and Hailemariam
1999) and (ii) the relationship between weights and completed fertility. The
ﬁrst approach is based on a multistate model which is diﬀerent from the
usual static models that aim at predicting the number of children ever born
conditional on a range of covariates. The second relies on count data regres-
sion which is common in the analysis of fertility. The paper is structured in
the following way: Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the current situation regarding
fertility in Ethiopia. Section 3 and 4 give an overview of the models and
data used, and a description of the results. The paper concludes in section
5 with a summary.
32 Fertility in Ethiopia—the setting
Ethiopia is among the African countries that show the highest population
growth rates of the world. At the same time with 72.4 million inhabitants
the country has the second largest population in sub-Saharan Africa after
Nigeria. The population growth rate is currently estimated to be 2.4%,
what translates into a doubling of the population within the next 30 years.
By year 2050, the country would then have the 10th largest population of
the world. The total fertility rate that measures the number of children
born to a woman during her lifetime is 5.9, which is above the sub-Saharan
average of 5.6. The prevalence rate of contraceptive use is low: only 8% of
all married women between 15 and 49 use any method of contraception. In
response to that, the Ethiopian government created in 1993 in the framework
of the National Population Policy local population councils with the aim of
increasing the use of contraceptives (National Population Policy of Ethiopia
1993, cited from Short and Kiros 2003), but still with a low impact.
Maternal mortality in Ethiopia is high, and hence this is likely to in-
ﬂuence the decision on how many children women want. The 2000 Demo-
graphic Health Survey (DHS) reports that 871 out of 100,000 births lead
to the death of the mother.1 Among the group of females aged 20 to 29,
which is the age group in which most pregnancies occur, more than 30% of
all deaths can be ascribed to maternal mortality. In rural areas, about 78%
of pregnant women receive no antenatal care.
The DHS also reports large gender diﬀerences of the number of desired
children. On average women desire 5.3 children while men want to have
6.4 children. Although these numbers vary substantially across individual
charateristics like age and education and the number of children already
alive, the message remains the same: women prefer fewer children than
men.
1If we treat every birth event as independent from each other and apply the probability
of surviving a birth to the total fertility rate, the probability of surviving six births is 95&.
43 Methodical Problems of Analyzing Determinants
of Fertility
The results of analyzing determinants of fertility are dependent on the mea-
sure of wanted fertility. The variation of the desired number of children
across individual and household characteristics as reported in the DHS sug-
gests that one should be cautious in interpreting these numbers. Young
couples’ agreement tends to be higher as compared to older couples. Any
analysis that relies on the number of desired children must take into ac-
count the possible ﬂuctuation of preferences over time. Further, according
to Pritchett (1994) parents tend to rationalize the number of children ex-
post, even if it actually exceeds their initially desired number of children,
because for most people, it is very diﬃcult to state that a child is unwanted
once it has been born. Statements on the desired number of children may
therefore be ﬂawed.
Another option is to use the observed number of children ever born to
analyze fertility behavior. This approach is also subject to potential bias.
Younger couples naturally have a lower number of children, as their family
planning has just begun. Most studies using children ever born, try to ac-
count for this eﬀect through including the age of wife and/or husband as an
independent variable. This method disregards that young couples may post-
pone births instead of limiting the number of children. They may eventually
have the same family size as older couples, but the younger couple achieves
it at a later point of time. This has been reported to be the case in Africa,
where contraceptives are often used for spacing births and not for limiting
the number of children (Schultz 1997, Hogan, Berhanu and Hailemariam
1999). When couples achieve their desired family size later, the inclusion of
age gives the impression that younger couples prefer smaller families. Hence,
studies relying on either the number of desired children or on the number of
children ever born while not accounting for spacing eﬀects use potentially
biased data.
Economic approaches to investigate fertility rely on either static or dy-
namic models which impose diﬀerent data requirements (Arroyo and Zhang
1997). Static models usually rely on information that is available in the
current period of observation and are easy to handle, as count data mod-
els which are available in most statistical software packages can be applied.
5However, these models require information on completed fertility, that is,
one needs to be sure that every woman considered in the sample does not
get any more children in the future.
Dynamic approaches often apply hazard rate models to estimate the time
between two births.2 An advantage of these models is that they allow for
coping with censored data, that is for couples who have not yet completed
their family planning. Authors applying hazard rate models ask for the time
between marriage and ﬁrst birth or the time between the nth and n + 1th
birth (Andres and Urzua 2003, Arnstein and Altankhuyag 2001). This piece-
wise approach ignores the preceding birth events and is highly vulnerable to
violations of a number of maintained assumptions (see Heckman and Walker,
1990a). The model proposed by Heckman and Walker (1987, 1990a, 1990b;
see also Newman and McCulloch 1984 for an alternative but less general
model) fully accounts for the whole birth history and can handle censored
data. A further advantage of this model is that it allows the variables in the
conditioning set to vary over time, a feature which is not inherent in static
models. In section 5 I apply a count data model to the number of children
ever born in households where the fertility cycle is ﬁnished.
4 Birth Spacing
4.1 The Model
The model applied here belongs to the hazard rate family and enables to
capture the dynamic nature of the birth process as well as the impact of
bargaining power on transition from one birth parity to another and is based
on Heckman and Walker (1987, 1990a, 1990b).3 The basic idea is to model
the entire birth history of a woman through a series of duration models
while simultaneously accounting for (i) the probability that a woman stops
her fertility cycle and (ii) the problem of censored observations. The latter
aspect is particularly useful in the present study because the data consist
2Hazard rate, survival or duration data models are build on the so called hazard func-
tion, which gives the probability that an individual remains in a certain state, e.g. the
state to have 1 child, the state to have 2 children, and so forth. An increase of the hazard
function implies that the time period between entering and leaving the state shortens and
a decrease means the opposite.
3A parity is in this context the time period between two events, i.e. births.
6of a single cross-section of observations from a household survey which was
not primarily created to capture fertility.
The birth history is modeled as a ﬁnite-state continuous time process
which starts at calendar time τ(0) when a woman enters her fertility cycle.
After remaining childless for t units of time, she gets her ﬁrst child denoted
by Y (τ) at calendar time τ(1) = τ(0)+t. The set of birth states is discrete,
that is Y (τ) ∈ Γ = 0,1,2,3,...,C and bounded from above (C < ∞).
The elapsed time between two births is denoted by T, whereas T0,...,Tc
represents the entire duration from the time of entering the fertility cycle
up to the last birth c. Note, that due to the right censoring of the data,
the ﬁnal parity is T¯ c, where ¯ C denotes the waiting time until the next birth,
which may or may not occur. Let H(τ) be the set of K covariates xk at
calendar time τ. The conditional hazard is then given by
hj(tj | H(τ(j − 1) + tj)) (1)
which gives the probability that a woman leaves the state at time τ. A
useful feature of the conditioning set is, that for each period it potentially
includes all past information up to tj, that is all past changes of the social
environment and the individual characteristics of the household and the
woman herself can be captured.
Integration of (1) with respect to t assuming that it is continuous yields
the survivor function





(hj(uj|H(τ(j − 1) + u))du

 (2)
which gives the probability that a woman remains childless up to t, or put
diﬀerently the probability that she remains in the jth parity j which can be
written as
P(Tj > tj|hj(tj|H(τ(j − 1) + tj))). (3)
Multiplying the jth hazard by the jth survivor function gives the density
of tj conditional on the covariates
gj(tj|H(τ(j−1)+tj)) = hj(tj|H(τ(j−1)+tj))·Sj(tj|H(τ(j−1)+tj)) (4)















hj(tj|H(τ(j − 1) + tj))
·Sj(tj|H(τ(j − 1) + tj))
(5)
where ¯ C denotes the actual observed number of children and C the number
of parities. Note that after bearing ¯ C children a woman made the transition
from parity ¯ C into parity C, which she may or may not ﬁnish with another
birth.
Modelling the birth history in the duration framework has the advantage
that censoring of the data is explicitly accounted for through inclusion of
the survivor function. As a woman enters the ﬁrst parity at time τ(0) her
actual number of children is observed at time τ(0) +
PJ
i=1 ti. The survivor
function ensures that regardless of how many children a woman has born at
the time of observation it is possible that she decides to have one birth more
in the future. This feature of the model will be discussed in the section on
estimation.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
The investigation of fertility behavior is usually made diﬃcult due to
presence of unobservables not captured by the conditioning set. Not ac-
counting for these eﬀects—here subsumed under θ—may severely bias the
estimated parameters. Considering unobserved eﬀects is especially appro-
priate because apart from individual speciﬁc characteristics as infecundity,
I do not have information on contraceptive practices.4 Although the neglect
of contraceptive use may not be too serious as Sibanda et al. (2003) report
that the prevalence of contraceptives is considerably lower in Ethiopia than
in comparable countries, the problem of unobserved infecundity remains.
Heckman and Walker (1990a, 1990b) note, that unobserved heterogene-
ity θ may be divided into two components: (i) one that is observed by the
4The 1995 round of the survey provides information on current uses of contracep-
tives. This however does not necessarily represent past behavior, since the introduction of
modern contraceptives is often a recent phenomenon and forced by governmental Family
Planning programs which take place with diﬀerent regional intensity.
8woman but which does not appear in the data, and (ii) one that neither
the analyst nor the woman observes. The ﬁrst component may be eﬀects
as personal experience with usage of contraceptives or biological infertility.
This information is unlikely to be available before the ﬁrst parity, but in the
second and every following transition a woman may build on this experience
and change her behavior accordingly. This process may be depicted within
the Bayesian framework where in every period θ is updated according to
past experience. Deﬁne the probability measure of θ as M(θ) with density
m(θ) and supp M(θ) = Θ, then the density of θ for parity i condtional on
the previous duration ti−1 is given by




To account for the Bayesian updating process the mean of previous dura-
tions is included in order to capture experience eﬀects that would otherwise
be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity. The second part of the hetero-
geneity is left for speciﬁcation and is modelled as a mixture distribution
given by
g(tj|H(τ − 1) + tj) =
Z
Θ
g(tj|H(τ − 1) + tj)dM(θ) (7)
θ in this respect captures any peculiarities which are not covered by the
independent variables in the conditioning set.
4.2 Estimation
In their work on fertility in Sweden, Heckman and Walker (1990) extended
the survivor function to include the possibility of stopping the birth process.
The stopping behavior is modelled as a mixture of the probability that a
woman decides to have no more children and the probability that she contin-
uous the transition process up to an unknown time. Denote the probability
that a woman stops child bearing for any reason (biological or behavioral)
after the jth birth with Pj. Then the conditional survivor function of parity
j can be written as








9The densities of t are modeled using a Weibull distribution which has
only positive support as required. The Weibull distribution contains an
additional parameter α, which measures the duration dependence of the
current parity. The hazard function shows duration dependence when it is
not constant. In the case of a Weibull distribution, one gets positive duration
dependence when for the hazard h(t) one gets dh(t)/dt > 0 which holds for
α > 1. A positive duration dependence implies, that with the time periods
getting longer, the probability of exiting the state increases.
In the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, one needs to consider the
distribution of θ. In a similar approach as the one presented here, Newman
and McCulloch (1984) assume the heterogeneity to pursue a certain para-
metric distribution and obtain the likelihood by integrating out the θ. This
approach, though common in many applications, has been demonstrated
by Heckman and Singer (1985) to be vulnerable to the misspeciﬁcation of
M(θ). To avoid here bias in the estimation of the parameters, the likelihood
is maximized as a ﬁnite mixture, where no parametric form of M(θ) needs
to be speciﬁed. In ﬁnite mixture models, one assumes that m(θ) has a ﬁ-
nite set of support points θ, to which the probabilities π are attached (see
McLachlan and Peel (2000) and Lesperance and Lindsay (2001) for exposi-
tions of the method). In other words one assumes that the population from
which the random variable tj is drawn can be decomposed into m distinct
subpopulations. The probability that t is drawn from the mth subpopu-
lation is given by πi, whereas
PM
i=1 π = 1 and πi ≥ 0. The θ’s can be
understood as parameters which capture the subpopulation characteristics.
As the number of subpopulations is unknown, it has to be estimated, which
is done by adding support points to the model until an information criterion
as the Akaike or the Schwartz criterion does not further improve. The log-
likelihood is maximized applying an EM-alogrithm proposed by Dempster,
Laird, and Rubin (1977). Using the new survivor function given by (8) the






















10where the b’s denote indicator functions b1 = 1[ ¯ C] and b2 = 1[C]. To








Assume that the number of components πm is known and the indicator dim
denotes whether tj was drawn from the mth subpopulation. The true value
of πm is not known, but assuming a given number of πm its expected value






and then taking the expectation of νim which is the average of νim over i
which yields E(νim) = πm. Estimation of the parameters of the likelihood
function proceeds with a given initial estimate of βm and πm from which the






dim[lnfm(ti;βm) + lnπm] (12)
dim is also unknown, but one can replace it by its expected value which is
equal to νim. After inserting νim into (12) one can maximize (12), obtain
new estimates of π and β, calculate νim using these estimates and (11),
insert them back into (12) and maximize. These iterations are repeated
until a previously deﬁned stopping criterion is met.5 Unfortunately, the
EM-Algorithm is vulnerable to the choice of starting values and it is not
sure whether one ﬁnds the optimum by repeated random starts. To account
for this shortcoming, I apply a simulated annealing global maximization
algorithm (Goﬀe, Ferrier and Williams 1994) in order to ﬁnd a good set
of starting values.6 For inference on the parameters, McLachlan and Peel
(2000) suggest to bootstrap the standard errors. As the model is quite large,
the computer needs quite a long time to ﬁnd a solution and bootstrapping
with 100 replications would take a couple of weeks. Hence, I apply the
5The stopping criterion used here is based on the predicted ﬁnal likelihood as described
in Lesperance and Lindsay (2001).
6I have implemented the MaxSa code provided by Charles Bos.
11Huber-White sandwich estimator which is robust to failures of the model
assumptions. This completes the estimation process the results of which
are presented below. All programming necessary has been done using Ox
version 3.40 (see Doornik, 2002).
4.3 Data and Variables
The data are taken from the 4th round of the Ethiopian Rural Household
Survey which was conducted in 1997 by the Economics Department of Addis
Ababa University, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI),
and the Center for Studies of African Economies (CSAE) of the University of
Oxford. The survey covered data from about 1,500 households from 15 sites
in rural Ethiopia and accounts for the large cultural and ethnic diversity in
Ethiopia.
The dependent variable used in this section is the time elapsed between
two births. In accordance to the fertility rate reported for Ethiopia (5.9), I
estimate the birth history up to the sixth child. To render the observations
comparable, I exclude cases according to a number of criteria: ﬁrst, I only
consider married couples and exclude unmarried relations, polygamous ar-
rangements and single households. Second, couples have to be within their
ﬁrst marriage, that is, neither husband nor wife should have lived in any
previous marriage. Unfortunately, a large portion of the respondents report
about previous marriages and hence the sample decreases by almost one half
due to this exclusion criterion. Third, I also exclude couples where twins
have been born, as this may exert an inﬂuence on the following durations
and the probability to stop the birth process. The resulting sample size
amounts to 468 observations. All durations start when the woman gets 14
years old since at roughly that age a woman enters her fertility cycle (see
Hotz, Klerman and Willis (1997) and the literature cited therein).
The data also contain information on assets brought to marriage (ABM),
including data on land, cattle and jewelry which are used as indicators of
individual bargaining weights. In the empirical literature on intra-household
bargaining much has been written about the diﬃculties of measuring bar-
gaining power (see Frankenberg and Thomas 2001, Agarwal 1997). The
bargaining weight is deﬁned as the level of inﬂuence an individual exerts on
household decision making. It may be determined by economic, social or
12cultural conditions as well as personal characteristics. In empirical studies
the bargaining weight is approximated by the level of utility an individual
would achieve if she were to leave the household. Income earned by women
has been proposed as a measure for female bargaining weight, though it is
potentially subject to endogeneity. It may be that a woman who exerts
suﬃcient inﬂuence on household decision making decides not to work out-
side the household, since her bargaining power already ensures a high share
of household consumption. The usage of ABM as an explanatory variable
circumvents this endogeneity problem, since it is largely independent of cur-
rent decisions. Further, ABM serve as a characterization of the fall-back
position, because assets reﬂect the means of survival an individual has in
case it comes to dissolution of the household. Using ABM as a measure of
relative bargaining position is not entirely unproblematic. Its validity cru-
cially depends on the control options in everyday life, the control in case
of divorce and ﬁnally on the ease to leave marriage. If, for example, the
costs to dissolve marriage are prohibitively high, the use of ABM may be
extremely low. As the data suggests, divorce is relatively common though
the data do not reveal anything about whether it was the man or the woman
who initiated divorce. It is likely to be the case that it is much easier for
men to leave marriage, even in the more liberal Northern regions Tigray
and Amhara, but the sheer number of divorces suggests, that in cases also
women seek and accomplish divorce. Dercon and Krishnan (1997) state,
while relying on anthropological evidence, that the division of assets upon
divorce is largely equal in the Northern and to some extent in the Central
regions. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2000) investigated the relation be-
tween ABM and control over resources in case of divorce. Though they do
not ﬁnd a strong relation between dissolution of marriage and control over
ABM in general (for example in case of death of the husband), they found
support for the hypothesis that control over ABM remains with the person
who brought them in in case of divorce. Hence, I treat ABM as a credible
exit option. All asset data are expressed in monetary terms while the re-
spective value has been adjusted to prices of the respective parities using a
consumer price index.7 As a further indicator of bargaining power I use the
gender of the head of household.
Child mortality needs to be considered in two ways. First, there is the
7The consumer price index used is the variable ’cpi97’, provided with the data.
13need to account for children who died after birth and thus do not appear in
the household roster. The birth event naturally prolongs the time between
adjacent births of children still alive. A dummy variable captures children
who died after birth. Second, as in a number of studies the old-age insurance
motive has been found to be a signiﬁcant determinant of fertility (Cain
1981, 1983, Jensen 1990, Nugent 1985, Nugent and Gillaspy 1983, Benefo
and Schultz 1996), high expected child mortality induces an increase of
fertility because parents need to ensure that a suﬃcient number of children
who take care of them in old ages survives. One drawback of the model
applied is that it is not able to capture the potential endogeneity of child
mortality. As Schultz (1997) has pointed out, high fertility may also impact
child mortality due to a ’hoarding’ eﬀect that overstretches the family’s
available resources. Expecting a high child mortality rate, couples may
decide to have more children than they can aﬀord. I try to remedy this
eﬀect through including village and cohort wise mortality rates and use
them as a proxy for expected mortality. For each observation i the proxy
is calculated as N−1 P
j∈Fv(i),j6=i xj where Fv(i) is the set of all women of
village and cohort v excluding woman i. xj takes on the value one for a child
who died under the age of 5 and N is the total number of children born in
v. I do not include the number of died children in the conditioning sets in
order to capture ’hoarding’ eﬀects as the birth equations are only estimated
up to the sixth birth.
In view of the large number of diﬀerent ethnic groups and religious be-
liefs, it is necessary to account for regional diﬀerences in terms of cultural
diversity that may inﬂuence the bargaining position of women. A set of
dummy variables capture Muslim and Orthodox beliefs which beside the
Protestants represent the largest religious group. In a study on behavior to-
wards family planning, Hogan, Berhanu, and Hailemariam (1999) point out
the diﬀerences among these groups towards female autonomy and fertility
preferences. For example, in contrast to outside restrictions which mus-
lim women face, they enjoy relatively high autonomy within the household.
Further, muslim women face greater diﬃculties when seeking divorce (Der-
con and Krishnan 1997). Further, I distinguish between the largest ethnic
groups which are Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray. Amhara and Tigreans and to
some extent Oromo as well, show a diﬀerent attitude towards marriage and
women as compared to Southern groups. To capture further geographical
14variation, two dummy variables represent the Southern and Central regions
of Ethiopia.
Economic theory predicts that with rising incomes couples desire a smaller
number of children and rather invest in the quality of children (Becker and
Lewis 1973, Willis 1973). Hence, it is necessary to control for levels of in-
come. Income in a dynamic setting is however diﬃcult to deal with when
only a cross-section of data is available. Income derived from agriculture
and informal labor is subject to annual ﬂuctuations depending on the cli-
matic, economic and political conditions. As Ethiopia has been experiencing
a number of severe famines and a long war, income cannot be assumed to
be stable over time. To account for these ﬂuctuations, I divide the house-
holds into four income groups and assume that membership to a particular
strata does not change over time. This can be justiﬁed through the fact
that social mobility is low. Land as the major means of income genera-
tion is traded rather occasionally, so that marriage serves as a substitute
for the land market. This also implies that most households have to derive
their living from the current endowment of assets and in most cases do not
have the opportunity to accumulate assets or savings (see Fafchamps and
Quisumbing 2004).
A crucial assumption in the present estimation framework is that the
conditional distribution of t is independent of the time when a woman en-
ters the ﬁrst parity. This assumption is violated as the women belong to
diﬀerent age cohorts which diﬀer in their epxeriences regarding changed so-
cial environments or improvements in medical service provision. In general,
one may follow one of two strategies to ensure that the indepence assumption
holds. Either the data set is separated into birth cohorts which are assumed
to be homogenous, or one introduces cohort speciﬁc dummy variables. As
the dataset is already relatively small and the number of parameters to be
estimated due to six possible birth events relatively large, I have adopted
the latter strategy. Two dummy variables representing age cohorts 50−59
and 60−69 are included to account for the diﬀerent points of time when the
respective women enter the fertility cycle. To capture the eﬀects of experi-
ence from past durations, the mean of all durations previous to the current
duration are included.
Finally, I have included two variables for the educational background of
the wife and husband. While female education is usually associated with a
15lower number of children, previous studies revealed that in Africa men’s ed-
ucation tends to increase fertility (Benefo and Schultz 1992). In the context
of this study, education is important with respect to its eﬀect on bargaining
power (Schultz 1999). Female education improves the bargaining position
since through additional income earning opportunities her economic contri-
bution to the household increases (Murthi, Guio, and Dreze 1995). However,
the impact of women’s education on her bargaining weight may be damp-
ened as the wage labor market is not well developed in many of the surveyed
villages and the overall level of education among women is very low. Lastly,
the choice of variables for the conditioning set is beside some small variations
the same across all parities. Each conditioning set includes time speciﬁc vari-
ables as well as variables which are assumed to be static over time. Table 1
in the appendix gives an overview of the variables included.
4.4 Results
The results of the hazard model are presented in table 2 in the appendix.
Using the information criteria, a two component model was selected. The
components are not easy to interpret as they may capture combined eﬀects.
The probabilities attached to the support points roughly divide the sample
into two halfs, which is too large to be explained by contraceptive users
and non-users. The components may capture regional diﬀerences as well
as infecundity. The results presented in Table 2 do further not allow for a
clear-cut answer on the impact of female bargaining weights on household
decision making. The respective parameters (BP Wife) are in four cases
negative that is, the probability of an early exit of the parity increases, but
only for the third parity the parameter becomes signiﬁcant. Two parameters
are positive and achieve in both cases a 5% -signiﬁcance level. This ﬁnding
is unexpected at least for the ﬁrst parity. This may be explained either
through a missing variable reﬂecting the age of entry into marriage, which
may be an important factor in predicting the hazard of the ﬁrst birth. On
the other hand, this ﬁnding possibly reﬂects that younger brides may be
given higher bride prices. The positive parameter that is found during the
fourth parity may be explained through an early leaver eﬀect. It may be
that women with high bargaining weights want to speed up the birth process
in order to stop it earlier.
16The respective parameters for husband’s bargaining weight (BP Hus-
band) are almost always signiﬁcant and except of one case show always a
contrasting sign as compared to female bargaining weights. This shows a dis-
parity of reproductive preferences among couples. Interestingly, the param-
eter increases in magnitude up to the third birth until it starts to decrease
again. That is, husbands may want to ensure a certain minimum critical
family size as soon as possible and afterwards prefer to slow down the pro-
cess as more and more mouths have to be fed. Although not signiﬁcant, the
parameter representing female bargaining weights also increases between the
ﬁfth and the sixth birth. This suggests, that bargaining power may lengthen
the period more and more with later births. Female headed households con-
sistently show negative parameters that achieve a 5% -signiﬁcance level in
three parities. These parameters clearly show, that women as the head of
household accomplish their fertility goals and may stop the birth process
earlier. They also have the children after much longer time intervals.
The income eﬀects are consistent with economic theory and predict that
the probability that a woman leaves a state decreases at higher levels of
income. That is, wealthier couples prefer longer periods between adjacent
births. Also, one can observe an upward trend of the parameter magnitude
at later births. The results of the impact of education are rather mixed.
Female education reveals consistently a positive sign, while the respective
eﬀect of husbands’ education is negative. This is in contrast to ﬁndings from
other studies conducted in the African context (Anker and Knowles, 1982;
Benefo and Schultz 1992), where male education leads to higher fertility and
shorter intervals between two births. However, the results obtained may be
spurious, due to the very low educational background of the women in the
sample.
The impact on duration emerging from the death of a child is as ex-
pected. In all cases the sign is negative, indicating that the death of a child
lengthens the time interval between adjacent (alive) births. Expected vil-
lage/cohort child mortality also always reveals the expected positive sign:
higher expected mortality rates lead couples to have children earlier and in
shorter time periods. However, only the parameters of the ﬁrst two parities
achieve a 5% -signiﬁcance level. Cohort eﬀects do not reveal any particu-
lar consistent pattern, though the older birth cohort show some tendency
to have shorter time intervals, which may have to do with a slight erosion
17of traditional cultural norms deﬁning the position of women in the family.
The cultural dummies reveal that Muslim families tend to have children in
shorter periods as compared to households with Orthodox beliefs. Tigreans
and Oromo have to some extent shorter intervals as the excluded Amhara.
The same holds for groups residing in the central region of Ethiopia.
Finally, the α’s need to be interpreted. All are highly signiﬁcant and
greater one, which means that all parities are subject to positive duration
dependence. As noted above, positive duration dependence implies that
with increasing length of time from the last birth, the probability increases
of leaving the current parity. This is plausible at early stages of the birth
process, as small families are rather rare. At later stages, this is not so easy
to explain, especially as the magnitude of the parameter increases with later
parities. The quit probabilities are also relatively small, which is conform
with the ﬁndings of Heckman and Walker (1990a, 1990b).
The several hints combined give a clearer picture on the household dec-
sion making process. The constrasting signs of wife’s and husband’s bar-
gaining weights reﬂect a clear disparity on the household decision over fer-
tility. Furthermore, female headed households—representing female auton-
omy—reveal consistent negative signs, which are in two cases signiﬁcant.
Ethnic group membership reveals, that a more liberal household organiza-
tion is in favor of longer time intervals. Taken together, the time intervals
appear to lengthen when women hold a more favorable position in the house-
hold. The determinants of this position are however manifold.
5 Number of Children
5.1 The Model and Estimation
In this section, I turn to the estimation of the eﬀects of bargaining weight on
the number of children. To arrive at data on completed fertility, I construct
a new data set where women under age 45 are excluded. Beyond this age,
the likelihood that the woman gives birth to a child is only 2%. A more con-
servative measure would be to exclude women younger than 49, but in order
to save observations the lower threshold appears to be appropriate. The
results however hold, when women younger than 49 are excluded. The new
sample comprises of 121 observations. As the model is substantially smaller
18and easier to handle, a number of village dummies have been included to
capture village eﬀects. However, due to the village wise construction of the
expected child mortality rate, this variable coincides with the village dum-
mies and thus mortality is excluded. The age of wife and husband are also
included to account for cohort eﬀects. None of the women included has any
reported educational background, which why only husbands’ education is
considered. Because of lacking observations, the female headed household
dummy had to be excluded as well.
Because the dependent variable consists now of the number of children
ever born, the data generating process is assumed to be Poisson. Despite its
restriction that the mean and variance are implicitly assumed to be equal
(the data is said to be equidispersed), the Poisson model has a number
of advantages. First, the Poisson MLE is most eﬃcient if the dependent
variable y is Poisson distributed, and second even if the assumption that y
follows a Poisson distribution is violated, the Poisson MLE is still consistent
(Wooldridge 2002, p.649). A violation of the assumption of equidispersion
does however harm the estimation of the standard errors of the parameters.
In order to obtain robust standard errors, I report the common sandwich
estimator.
A ﬁrst look at the variance of the regression yields a value of ˆ σ2 = 0.735,
which is an indication of underdispersion. The application of a regression
based test for equidispersion proposed by Cameron and Trivedi (1998) sup-
ports this ﬁnding 8. The α-value obtained is −0.066 (with a standard error
of 0.017) and is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 0.1%-level. In this
case, the common ﬂexible alternative to the Poisson model, the Negative
Binomial model is not appropriate as it cannot handle underdispersion.
8The test procedure tests the validity of the Poisson distribution against the alternative
which is a negative binomial distribution and is appropriate to detect either over- or
underdispersion. Let ˆ µi be the predicted value of the dependent variable y. Then the test
can be conducet through regressing
(yi − ˆ µi)
2 − yi
ˆ µi
= αˆ µi + ui (13)
If α > 0 the data is overdispersed, and if α < 0 the data is underdispersed, which can be
tested by using a simple t-test.
195.2 Results
Table 3 reports the estimated parameters of the Poisson model. First of
all, the impact of bargaining power on the number of children is striking.
The parameter of BP Wife is negative while BP Husband is positive and
both are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%-level. That is, given
the estimate of −1.12 for BP Wife, an increase of the woman’s bargaining
weight by 1 unit, reduces the expected number of children by 11.2%. The
contrasting signs reﬂect the intrahousehold conﬂict concerning the decision
on the realized number of children. This also demonstrates, that female au-
tonomy reduces the number of realized children. Because the mean has been
modelled with µ = exp(xβ) the parameters can be interpreted in terms of
a semi-elasticity. The coeﬃcients on age show that younger men have fewer
children than older. None of the parameters representing income is signif-
icant. Orthodox households have signiﬁcantly more children than Muslim
households. The impact of education of the husband is negative, but not
signiﬁcant.
6 Conclusions
This study looks at the impact of intrahousehold bargaining weights on
household decision making over fertility. In view of diﬀering preferences to-
wards the number of children, it was expected that the individual bargaining
position determines the leeway to accomplish personal fertility goals. The re-
sults clearly show that the bargaining weights impact on the household deci-
sion process regarding the birth spacing and the number of children. Female
autonomy lengthens the time intervals between adjacent births, although no
unique determinant can be identiﬁed, as well as it reduces the number of
children. On the other hand, the bargaining weight of men increases the
number of children and shortens the time intervals between births.
This ﬁnding suggests that in order to eﬀectively reduce fertility, public
family planning programs need to address women and men simultaneously.
Men because their opposition to family planning is an important reason for
not using contraceptives to space or limit births. Women, since their low
bargaining weight hinders them to accomplish their reproductive goals. The
fact that female autonomy is related to lower fertility also opens the door
20for other means to reduce fertility rates, e.g. through improving the bar-
gaining position of women thus enabling them to push their goals through.
This could be achieved via the development of labor markets and improved
education for women and girls. Although education did not turn out to be
a determinant of prolongation and the number of births, it may be never-
theless important in the presence of income earning opportunities outside
the household. As the case of Kerala in India demonstrates, fertility rates
decline when women ﬁnd better outside options in terms of earning income
and participation in political decision making (Murthi, Guio and Dreze 1995,
Sen 1997).
The results further emphasize the many facets of intrahousehold bargain-
ing, which renders the operationalization of the bargaining weights diﬃcult.
Personality, economic environments, or cultural traditions that deﬁne the
role of the women in family and society appear to inﬂuence the women’s
bargaining position, which makes it unlikely to construct a unique indicator
that allows for capturing all determinants.
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25Appendix
Table 1: Means and descriptions of variables
Dynamic data
Timelength BP Wife BP Husband Durat Died
Parity 1 8.05 0.10 0.84 0.19
Parity 2 4.65 0.12 1.16 8.05 0.06
Parity 3 5.09 0.17 1.39 6.35 0.03
Parity 4 3.66 0.21 1.64 6.07 0.01
Parity 5 3.47 0.22 1.85 5.85
Parity 6 4.05 0.23 1.99 5.75 0.01
Time invariant data
FHH 0.03 Female headed household
Cohort 50-59 0.54 Age cohort 50 to 59
Cohort 60-69 0.28 Age chohort 60 to 69
Village Mort. 0.06 Expected child mortality rate
Inc. Quart. 1 0.16 Upper income quartile









26Table 2: Jointly estimated parameters of all parities
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
First Birth Second Birth Third Birth
Alpha 1.954 30.145 ** 1.895 28.793 ** 1.926 27.130 **
Constant -3.896 -18.372 ** -3.649 -14.047 ** -2.540 -8.626 **
BP Wife 0.072 9.000 ** -0.007 -0.776 -0.023 -2.980 **
BP Husband -0.043 -1.476 0.096 4.034 ** 0.208 8.308 **
Durat 0.029 2.521 ** -0.236 -8.442 **
Died -0.529 -3.996 ** -0.911 -5.580 ** -1.038 -5.299 **
FHH -0.269 -1.462 -0.820 -3.512 ** -0.590 -1.522
Cohort 50-59 0.256 1.980 ** 0.570 3.004 ** -0.283 -1.516
Cohort 60-69 0.180 1.715 * -0.174 -1.399 0.135 0.830
Village Mort. 2.589 3.109 ** 5.940 6.400 ** 0.665 0.721
Inc. Quart. 1 -1.393 -10.527 ** -0.800 -5.080 ** 0.296 1.218
Inc. Quart. 2 -0.520 -4.605 ** 0.098 0.726 0.979 4.711 **
Education Wife 0.033 1.089 0.171 5.597 ** -0.040 -1.138
Education Husb. 0.031 1.403 -0.030 -1.241 -0.027 -0.876
Muslim -0.295 -2.117 ** 0.479 3.671 ** 0.071 0.341
Orthodox 0.115 0.470 0.470 2.111 ** 0.361 1.744 *
Tigray 0.380 1.447 0.220 1.065 -0.971 -4.130 **
Oromo 0.006 0.042 -0.181 -0.933 -0.248 -1.674
North -0.098 -0.636 0.086 0.420 0.125 0.623
Central -0.054 -0.354 -0.519 -2.499 ** -0.182 -0.967
Quit Probabilities 0.039 0.019 0.075
Fourth Birth Fifth Birth Sixth Birth
Alpha 2.468 23.221 ** 2.667 15.284 ** 2.702 12.710 **
Constant -3.274 -10.480 ** -4.599 -4.428 ** -2.875 -6.629 **
BP Wife 0.029 4.554 ** -0.064 -0.581 -0.287 -0.960
BP Husband 0.073 3.607 ** 0.066 3.747 ** 0.059 2.663 **
Durat 0.110 2.464 -0.018 -0.190 0.049 0.345
Died -0.686 -1.745 * 0.347 1.420
FHH -1.236 -3.373 -0.735 -1.106 -9.230 -0.529
Cohort 50-59 -0.024 -0.120 ** 0.700 2.236 ** 0.387 1.226
Cohort 60-69 -0.042 -0.263 0.269 1.148 -0.378 -0.891
Village Mort. 1.252 1.157 1.711 1.601 1.110 0.625
Inc. Quart. 1 -1.474 -5.205 0.525 0.530 -1.862 -4.343 **
Inc. Quart. 2 -0.743 -2.940 ** 0.609 0.633 -1.878 -4.376 **
Education Wife 0.105 2.647 ** 0.012 0.156 0.207 1.976 **
Education Husb. -0.068 -1.585 ** 0.040 0.687 -0.149 -2.450 **
Muslim 0.984 3.855 ** 1.119 3.950 ** 0.625 1.663 *
Orthodox 0.339 1.069 ** -0.676 -1.639 0.553 1.367
Tigray 0.618 1.868 0.170 0.376 0.005 0.013
Oromo 0.314 1.713 ** -0.680 -2.175 ** 0.201 0.481
North -0.624 -2.690 0.053 0.156 -0.271 -0.485
Central -0.806 -3.956 ** 0.291 1.292 0.009 0.018
Quit Probabilities 0.113 0.179
Log-Likelihood: -4254.12
**signiﬁcant at 5% level
27Table 3: Estimates of child no model
Estimates t-value
BP Wife -0.117 -2.565 **
BP Husband 0.039 5.970 **
Age Wife 0.004 0.249
Age Husband -0.018 -1.991 **
Educ Husband -0.152 -0.504
Inc. Quart. 1 -0.009 -0.046
Inc. Quart. 2 -0.046 -0.268
Inc. Quart. 3 -0.206 -1.187
Muslim 0.415 -0.504
Christian 0.664 1.418
Tigray 0.207 3.077 **
Oromo 0.452 0.756
Constant 2.073 1.366
Number of observations: 121
Log-likelihood: -236.790
Pseudo R-square: 0.196
** signiﬁcant at 5% level
* signiﬁcant at 10% level
Estimates of village dummies not reported
28